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We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring 
on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks 
for the period 2005–2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO 
power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. 
We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend pay- 
out ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs 
do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage 
monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitor- 
ing by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of 
the board members, increases performance but decreases payout 
ratios. These ﬁndings are contrary to those from the entrenchment 
literature for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Government ownership and the 
presence of a government oﬃcial on the board of directors of the 
bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that gov- 
ernment is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors be- 
fore the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that 
government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and 
this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense 
of minority shareholders. 
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 1. Introduction 
Powerful CEOs can invest in non-value maximizing projects to pursue managerial objectives in- 
cluding empire-building, expense preference behavior and the like. 1 As such, shareholders monitor 
CEOs in order to prevent such expropriation, but this can be costly if ownership is dispersed ( Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986 ). A partial solution to this problem is provided by dividend payouts. These can act as
a monitoring device for shareholders because they reduce the amount of cash that CEOs can dissipate
in non-value maximizing projects ( Jensen, 1986 ) and also increase the frequency of CEO scrutiny from
outside investors ( Easterbrook, 1984 ). 
The U.S. literature related to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms documents that CEO entrenchment leads to higher 
dividend payout ratios ( Hu and Kumar, 2004; Elyasani and Zhang, 2013 ). This behavior is ascribed to
the incentive of entrenched CEOs to discourage minority shareholder monitoring. Where corporate 
governance is weak dividends act as a pre-commitment device: a promise to regularly pay cash to
shareholders reduces agency costs since it reduces the likelihood that these funds will be wasted on
projects that increase the private beneﬁts of CEOs without maximizing shareholder value ( John and
Knyazeva, 2006 ). However, the incentive to pay larger dividends also depends on whether entrenched
CEOs can fend off take-over threats ( Stulz, 1988 ), and on the degree to which monitoring from the
board of directors is effective ( Boumosleh and Cline, 2015 ). A possible reason for weak shareholder
monitoring and low dividend payouts relates to the protection of the rights of minority shareholders.
In their seminal paper, La Porta et al. (20 0 0) provide evidence that in countries with stronger minority
rights payout ratios are higher, suggesting that high payout ratios are an outcome, rather than a sub-
stitute, of strong minority rights. Consistent with this hypothesis, Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) ﬁnd
a positive link between the quality of corporate governance and payout ratios. 2 There is evidence also
that dividends dampen expropriation in group-aﬃliated ﬁrms ( Faccio et al., 2001 ), as investors antici-
pate the risk of expropriation from the controlling shareholder and require higher payouts. Moreover, 
shareholders in countries with strong creditor rights tend to be more sensitive to possible expropria-
tion from insiders, suggesting that ﬁrm insiders set dividend policies with the objective to minimize
agency costs of both equity and debt ( Shao et al., 2013 ). This is an important ﬁnding – in equilibrium,
payout ratios should reﬂect the monitoring incentives of all stakeholders. 
Building upon this literature, we aim to investigate the relationship between CEO power and divi-
dend payouts in the banking sector. This is of interest because unlike non-bank ﬁrms, the objectives
of managers and shareholders can conﬂict with those of other powerful stakeholders such as deposi-
tors and government regulators. Bank executives are subject to the scrutiny of different stakeholders. 
For instance, Schaeck et al. (2012) provide evidence of shareholder discipline for risky institutions, 
while there is no evidence of such discipline from debt holders and regulators. Monitoring by minor-
ity shareholders may well inﬂuence CEO behavior less than oversight from the government. In this
case, the government may favor lower payouts since this could improve bank capital positions, result-
ing in safer institutions. Bank safety is a primary concern for the government, because bank failures
result in long-lasting negative effects on economic growth ( Kupiec and Ramirez, 2013 ). 
Because of government monitoring, the relation between CEO power and dividend payouts in bank- 
ing is not necessarily positive. Banks with entrenched CEOs may have relatively low payout ratios to
deter greater government scrutiny. Dividend policy can shape the features of agent-principal issues in 
banking and as such is worthy of further investigation. 1 Alternatively, bank CEOs can decide not to take projects with positive Net Present Value (NPV) ( Vallascas and Hagendorff, 
2013 ). 
2 Other recent literature, however, ﬁnds that dividends may act as a substitute for strong minority rights ( De Cesari, 2012 ), 
and can mitigate the conﬂict between strong and weak stakeholders ( Bøhren et al., 2012 ). This is in-line with the ‘substitute 
model’ for dividends. Dividends are paid by insiders to establish a good reputation and reduce conﬂicts with minority share- 
holders ( La Porta et al., 20 0 0 ). According to the ‘outcome model’, dividends are the ‘outcome’ of regulation that protects the 
rights of minority shareholders ( La Porta et al., 20 0 0 ). 
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wCharacteristics of CEO power and dynamics are strongly intertwined with the role of bank cor-
orate governance. 3 This topic has recently drawn attention from academics and policy makers alike
 Erkens et al., 2012; Arnaboldi and Casu, 2011 ), because poor corporate governance can increase the
robability of bank failure, 4 with potentially large negative externalities due to contagion risk, disrup-
ion of the payment system, and costs deriving from deposit insurance payouts ( BIS, 2010; Mülbert,
010 ). 5 
Academic and policy interest in bank dividend policy has increased because of the importance
f retaining earnings for bank soundness, especially during a recessionary period ( Financial Stability
oard, 2009; Srivastav et al., 2013; Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013; Hirtle, 2014 ). Recent developments
n banking regulation also impose restrictions on dividends for undercapitalized banks ( Caruana,
010 ). This is necessary because banks can transfer default risk to their creditors and (when bailouts
ake place) to the taxpayer, a phenomenon known as risk-shifting ( Acharya et al., 2011; Kanas, 2013;
nali, 2014 ). For this reason, the government has incentives to monitor bank dividend policy. While
here are studies that investigate bank CEO incentives ( Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011 ), and the link
etween government ownership and bank performance ( Shen and Lin, 2012 ) and risk-taking ( Iannotta
t al., 2013 ), so far the literature has neglected the impact of government monitoring on bank divi-
end policy, and how it interacts with CEO power and incentives. In this paper, we intend to ﬁll this
mportant gap in the literature. 
We investigate the association between CEO power, internal monitoring from board of directors,
overnment monitoring, and dividend payouts for banks operating in 15 European Union (EU-15)
ember states. We restrict our analysis to EU countries given the more uniform bank regulatory
ramework. Three main proxies for CEO power are investigated: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and un-
orced CEO turnover (that is, turnover unrelated to CEO dismissal). Internal monitoring from the board
f directors is proxied using director ownership, which has been found to be positively related to ﬁrm
erformance in the non-ﬁnancial literature. While CEO power proxies are expected to be negatively
orrelated with performance (the CEO becomes entrenched as she gains more power in the decision-
aking process of the bank), internal monitoring proxies are expected to be positively correlated with
erformance. Our modeling approach also controls for a variety of determinants of dividend payout
atios. Unlike the previous literature on bank dividend policy, we can exploit data on government
onitoring at the bank level in terms of ownership and the presence of government oﬃcials repre-
ented on bank board’s so as to see how the authorities monitor dividend policy. 
Our study presents various innovations. First, we use a new hand-collected dataset on bank own-
rship structure and corporate governance for 109 listed banks operating in EU-15 countries and com-
ine this sample with data from Bankscope, Bloomberg, Datastream, Factset, SNL ﬁnancial, and Lex-
sNexis. Second, we employ Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation to elicit the impact of CEO power
n bank payout ratios. In particular, we employ a dummy identifying CEOs that are also among the
ounders of the bank as an instrument for CEO ownership, unforced turnovers, and CEO tenure. Being
 founder of the bank is positively correlated with CEO ownership and CEO tenure and negatively
orrelated with unforced CEO turnovers, satisfying the relevance restriction. Moreover, since the CEO
oes not have to decide every year to be a founder, this variable is clearly exogenous to dividend
olicy decisions. Finally, following Hirtle (2014) , we also consider the effect of share repurchases. 
Our main ﬁnding is that powerful CEOs tend to be detrimental for bank performance and dis-
ribute lower dividend payouts. In particular, we ﬁnd a negative relation between CEO ownership and
ayout ratios (performance) and between CEO tenure and payout ratios (performance), and a positive3 Corporate governance can be deﬁned as ‘the allocation of authority and responsibilities, i.e. the manner in which the busi- 
ess and affairs of a bank are governed by its board and senior management’ ( BIS, 2010 , p. 5). 
4 Since CEOs tend to be risk-averse ( Smith and Stulz, 1985 ), entrenchment should reduce bank risk-taking. Entrenchment 
an thus reduce the probability of bank default and, in the presence of government-sponsored safety nets (such as deposit 
nsurance), may beneﬁt the public as a whole. Recent contributions provide evidence of a nexus between CEO power and bank 
isk-taking ( Pathan, 2009 ), and CEO compensation incentives and bank risk-taking ( Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011 ). Fahlenbrach 
nd Stulz (2011) ﬁnd that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned to those of shareholders did not perform bet- 
er during the crisis. Their ﬁndings are at odds with the view that a lack of alignment between CEO and shareholder incentives 
as a root cause of the ﬁnancial crisis. 
5 For these reasons, bank directors should comply with higher and broader standards of care ( Macey and O’Hara, 2003 ). 
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 relation between unforced CEO turnover and payout ratios (performance). Stronger internal monitor- 
ing from the board of directors, as proxied by the average shareholding of board members, improves
performance and decreases payout ratios. These ﬁndings suggest that entrenched bank CEOs tend to 
distribute lower payout ratios, and stronger internal monitoring from board members decreases pay- 
out ratios, in contrast with what has been found in the non-ﬁnancial literature. Moreover, when the
government is a large owner or there is a government oﬃcial on the bank board, payout ratios are
lower, while performance does not change. These results suggest that monitoring from the govern- 
ment is detrimental to minority shareholders because the government is incentivized to put bank 
safety and the interests of creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. The remainder of the
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section
3 describes the methodology and the data sample. Section 4 reports the results and robustness checks
and Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
This section brieﬂy reviews the literature on dividend policy of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms and banks. 
2.1. Dividend policy and CEO entrenchment 
Dividend policy is one of the cornerstones of ﬁnancial economics and an extensive literature has
evolved since Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) seminal work on the irrelevance of dividend policy. In
the presence of taxes, a zero-dividend policy would be optimal ( Farrar and Selwyn, 1967; Brennan,
1970 ). Yet, ﬁrms do pay dividends. 
Subsequent studies have sought to test Miller and Modigliani’s proposition to see if the results
derived from theory hold in real ﬁnancial markets (where the assumptions of perfect information, no
tax and agency costs, typically do not hold) ( Lease et al., 20 0 0 ). Empirical literature spans an array of
areas covering dividend policy and how it relates to: tax clienteles ( Elton and Gruber, 1970 ), agency
costs ( Easterbrook, 1984 ), signalling effects ( Aharony and Swary, 1980 ), life-cycle factors ( DeAngelo et
al., 20 06, 20 08 ), catering incentives ( Baker and Wurgler, 2004 ), and behavioral factors ( Turner et al.,
2013 ). 
One branch of the literature focusses on the relation between managerial entrenchment and div- 
idend policy. The entrenchment hypothesis argues that managers who fear disciplinary actions tend 
to pay higher dividends as a protection against such actions ( Zwiebel, 1996; Fluck, 1999; Allen et al.,
20 0 0 ). This hypothesis is grounded in the principle that dividends are paid to decrease agency costs
between managers and shareholders ( Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986 ). By paying dividends, man-
agers increase the utility of outside shareholders and decrease monitoring incentives. Literature on 
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms typically support the entrenchment hypothesis ( Hu and Kumar, 2004; Elyasani and
Zhang, 2013 ). However, the incentive to pay dividends as a monitoring device is negligible for CEOs
that can fend off take-over threats ( Stulz, 1988 ). In general, entrenched CEOs are less incentivized to
pay large amounts of dividends in the absence of monitoring from minority shareholders ( Hu and Ku-
mar, 2004; Elyasani and Zhang, 2013 ), and when shareholder rights are weak ( La Porta et al., 20 0 0;
Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012 ). On the other hand, in the presence of laws that insulate managers from
takeovers, dividend payout ratios fall ( Francis et al., 2011 ). 
2.2. Dividend policy in banking: The role of government monitoring 
In banking dividend policy is an under-researched area. Early studies focus on the signalling power
of bank dividends ( Keen, 1983; Bessler and Nohel, 1996, 20 0 0 ). More recently, bank dividend policy
has been investigated because of possible risk-shifting behavior ( Acharya et al., 2011; Srivastav et al.,
2013; Kanas, 2013; Onali, 2014; Hirtle, 2014 ). Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013) conﬁrm the importance
of size, proﬁtability, growth opportunities, and agency costs in determining bank dividend policy both 
before and during the ﬁnancial crisis. 
In banking, monitoring can come from the government as well as outside shareholders. The 
government has incentives to monitor bank dividend policy so as to minimize the likelihood that
E. Onali et al. / J. Finan. Intermediation 27 (2016) 89–117 93 
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oxcessive dividend payouts lead to inadequate equity capital buffers. For this reason, restrictions
n dividend payments and share repurchases for under-capitalized banks are part of the Basel III
ramework. All other things being equal, a low dividend payout ratio can reduce the strength of
overnment monitoring on the CEO, because of the positive impact on bank stability. A low dividend
ayout ratio could reduce potential losses for the deposit insurance provider, and in the case of a
apital shortfall the government is incentivized to exert monitoring pressure on the bank (see, among
thers, Pennacchi, 1987 ). In the words of Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013, p. 57) : ‘[…] the pressure
ssociated with holding capital levels near or below the minimum requirement will lead banks to
lowback earnings to recapitalize themselves.’ 
Because of these reasons, there is a clear conﬂict of interest between the government and outside
hareholders as the government has a preference for low dividend payouts while outside shareholders
refer high payouts. 
All other things being equal, the sign of the relationship between CEO power and dividend payout
atios depends on whether entrenched CEOs wish to discourage monitoring from the government (en-
renched CEOs prefer low dividend payout ratios) or from the outside shareholders (entrenched CEOs
refer high dividend payout ratios). To the knowledge of the authors, there is currently no theoretical
ontribution that can help us predict the sign of this relationship. We expect that in Europe, a com-
ination of weak protection of minority shareholders ( Faccio et al., 2001 ) and government monitoring
ay allow entrenched bank CEOs to pay lower dividend payout ratios than CEOs with less power. 
To examine these relationships we employ three proxies for CEO power: CEO Ownership , Unforced
EO Turnover , and CEO Tenure . As CEO Ownership and CEO Tenure increase, the CEO becomes more
owerful, in the sense that they acquire a stronger position in the decision-making process of the
ank. 6 CEO Ownership has two types of effects: an entrenchment effect, because of the voting power
ssociated with the ownership of bank shares, and an incentive effect deriving from the right to re-
eive dividends ( Stulz, 1988; Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002 ). The positive correlation between CEO Owner-
hip and CEO power is substantiated by recent research showing that an increase in CEO Ownership
ecreases the likelihood of a CEO dismissal ( Bhagat et al., 2010 ). 
CEO Tenure is the natural logarithm of the number of years for which the CEO has been in oﬃce.
inkelstein and Hambrick (1989) argue that some determinants of CEO power take time to develop,
nd for this reason CEO power tends to increase with tenure. 7 Since the relationship between tenure
nd dividend payout ratios may be nonlinear ( Hu and Kumar, 2004 ), we consider the natural loga-
ithm of tenure (in years). While CEO Ownership and CEO Tenure increase CEO power, CEO turnover
vents should reduce it. This is because the new CEO may need time to entrench and pursue policies
hat do not maximize shareholder value ( Jiraporn et al., 2012 ). However, CEO Turnover may depend
n dividends, since dividend cuts may lead to CEO dismissal ( Schaeck et al., 2012 ). For this reason
e consider only unforced CEO turnover as a proxy for CEO power, creating a dummy variable equal
o one if turnover that cannot be deﬁned as forced takes place, and zero otherwise ( CEO Unforced
urnover ). In a nutshell, unforced turnovers refer to turnovers that are not a result of dismissal, for
nstance, cases in which the CEO has retired. 8 
Our CEO power proxies are likely to be related to “bad” corporate governance. Apart from CEO
wnership , for which the incentive effect could dominate the entrenchment effect, the stronger the
EO, the stronger the degree of agency costs between the CEO and shareholders. We expect dividend
ayouts to be negatively linked CEO Ownership and CEO Tenure and positively related to CEO Unforced
urnover . This is in contrast with the received wisdom in the non-ﬁnancial literature, which posits6 Since CEO Ownership is positively skewed, we repeat our main estimations using the natural logarithm of CEO Ownership . 
he results are virtually the same. 
7 CEO Tenure may also increase moral hazard, since for CEOs close to retirement reputational damage resulting from dismissal 
s less important ( Murphy, 1986; Hu and Kumar, 2004 ). 
8 In Appendix A1 we provide more detailed explanations of how we distinguish between forced and unforced CEO turnover. 
his proxy is related to CEO Tenure , because turnover results in a drop in tenure. However, while tenure can be related to recent 
ismissals (which may be related to dividend cuts), for Unforced CEO Turnover such reverse causality we believe is unlikely to 
ccur. 
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 that ﬁrms with entrenched CEOs should have larger dividend payout ratios to discourage monitoring 
from outside shareholders. 
What happens if we consider the impact of stock ownership of board members? This variable
should be a proxy for “good” governance because, as suggested by Bhagat et al. (2008) , director own-
ership improves monitoring on the CEO and other executives. Empirical studies show that director 
ownership consistently correlates with good performance ( Bhagat and Bolton, 2008, 2013 ). For this
reason, we also investigate the impact of this variable on payout ratios and performance. Theoret-
ically, larger director ownership should lead to less entrenchment, and therefore should lead to a
decrease in agency costs and dividend payouts. Following Bhagat and Bolton (2013) , we employ the
proxy Director Ownership €, which consists of the average value of the stake of board members (in
millions of Euros). 9 
Pressure from the government could lead to lower dividend payout ratios, as a result of potential
political and reputational damage associated with bank failure ( Brown and Dinç, 2005 ). In the follow-
ing section we outline the impact of government monitoring on dividend payout ratios in the form of
both government ownership and the representation of government oﬃcials on bank boards. 
2.3. The impact of government monitoring 
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has prompted a reconsideration of the role of government monitoring in
the banking system, with the objective of aligning private incentives with public interest. Of particu-
lar interest is the case of government ownership. While government ownership of banks can provide
the authorities with an additional tool for crisis management, it may also give rise to agency prob-
lems – for instance, politically motivated lending can lead to ineﬃciencies and cronyism ( ˇCihák and
Demirgüç-Kunt, 2013 ). Iannotta et al. (2007) provide evidence of a negative effect of government mon-
itoring, in the form of government ownership, on bank performance. In our analysis, we are interested
in the role of government ownership on agency costs and private incentives. 
According to Gugler (2003) , when the government acquires ownership of a ﬁrm, there is a dou-
ble principal-agent problem: between the government and citizens (the government is the agent), 
and managers (the government is the principal). Government ownership should result in increased 
monitoring and therefore higher dividend payout ratios, however, the government’s objectives can be 
twofold: (1) maximizing shareholder value; and (2) protecting depositors’ rights. The latter objective, 
as mentioned above, is likely to be a consequence of possible reputational and political damage in the
case of bank liquidation, 10 or it may be associated with concerns of potential losses deriving from de-
posit insurance schemes or other types of (implicit or explicit) guarantees. Since high dividend payout
ratios reduce the ability of a bank to pay back its creditors, government monitoring can also lead to
lower dividend payout ratios. 
We employ two proxies for government monitoring. The ﬁrst proxy is the percentage stockholding 
of the government, Government Ownership . This proxy is highly positively skewed, and for this reason
we take this variable in natural logs. The second proxy considers both government ownership and the
presence of a government oﬃcial on the board of directors of the bank. We construct the dummy
variable Government monitoring which takes the value one if either the government owns at least 3%
of the bank shares 11 or there is a government oﬃcial on the board of directors of the bank, and zero
otherwise. These variables are assumed to be positively correlated with the extent of government 
monitoring. 9 This proxy is, according to Bhagat and Bolton (2013, p. 105) “simple, intuitive, less prone to measurement error, and not 
subject to the problem of weighting a multitude of governance provisions in constructing a governance index.” Because data on 
director ownership tends to be available at the bank-level but not at the director-level, we cannot calculate the median director 
ownership for each bank. 
10 Iannotta et al. (2013) ﬁnd that government-owned banks face strong political pressure and may pursue objectives different 
from proﬁt maximization. During election years, government-owned banks display higher lending growth and lower proﬁtabil- 
ity than private banks. Higher lending growth is consistent with the government objective to favor political supporters. 
11 This is the sample mean for Government Ownership (see Table 3 ), rounded up to the nearest integer. Using alternative 
thresholds, such as 2%, 4%, or 6% does not change substantially our main results. 
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Q. Methodology and data 
This section describes the methodology and data set. Section 3.1 describes the econometric frame-
ork. Section 3.2 describes our instrumental variables. Section 3.3 outlines the data set. 
.1. Methodology 
The empirical literature on CEO entrenchment for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms is heterogeneous in terms
f econometric methodology and variables chosen. 12 Since the government is likely to be concerned
bout safety, and common equity is a key component of the regulatory capital in banking, we employ
he dividend to equity ratio as the dependent variable, following previous literature on bank dividend
olicy ( Acharya et al., 2012; Kanas, 2013; Onali, 2014 ). Using equity in the denominator rather than
arnings has an additional advantage: it eliminates the problem of dealing with negative dividend
ayout ratios. However, since the ratio of dividends to equity is highly skewed to the right, in our
ain regressions we use this variable in logs, DPE (Ln). 
In the spirit of Bhagat and Bolton (2008, 2013) , we rely on a simultaneous equation framework to
ease out the relation between dividend policy, CEO power and performance. In our ﬁrst set of tests
e focus on the relation between CEO power, performance, and dividend policy: 
Div it = f ( P er f it , CEO it , C it ) (1)
here i = 1, 2, …, N labels panel units (banks), t = 1, 2, …, T i labels time periods (years), Div is the
roxy for the payout ratio, Perf is the proxy for performance, CEO the proxy for CEO power, and C is a
ector of control variables. As proxies for performance, we choose the Market-to-book ratio, and Tobin
 . We choose these proxies because they are related to the existence of growth opportunities and are
herefore linked to the concept of CEO entrenchment: banks with high Market-to-book ratios and high
obin Q are likely to have projects with positive NPV. Thus, a negative relation between performance
nd payout ratios suggests that banks decrease payout ratios to invest in projects with positive NPV. 13
f the relation is positive, on the other hand, banks tend to decrease payout ratios despite the absence
f projects with positive NPV, suggesting expropriation of minority shareholders. Moreover, these ra-
ios are less likely to be manipulated by banks than accounting measures of performance such as ROA
r ROE. 14 
To better identify whether the CEO is effectively entrenched or not, we must also investigate the
eterminants of performance variables. If the proxies for CEO power that we employ increase perfor-
ance, then the CEO is unlikely to be entrenched. On the other hand, if there is a negative or insignif-
cant relation between the CEO proxies and performance, then the CEO is likely to be entrenched. For
xample, in the case of CEO Ownership and performance proxies, a positive relation would suggest
bsence of entrenchment. 
As described above, we also consider the effect of director ownership, using the proxy Director
wnership €. 
To examine the impact of government monitoring on bank dividend policy, we employ the follow-
ng speciﬁcation: 
Div it = f ( P er f it , Gov it , C it ) (2)
n our main regressions, we include both bank and year ﬁxed effects to account for unobservable,
ime-invariant bank-speciﬁc characteristics, and time-varying shocks on the European banking indus-
ry, assumed to have the same impact on dividend policy in all observed banks. For these tests, we
ely on 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions. However, we also employ 3SLS models in robustness
ests. 12 For instance, Francis et al. (2011) employ dividends scaled by earnings, dividends scaled by total assets (book value), and 
ividends scaled by total assets (market value). 
13 Blau and Fuller (2008) develop a model that emphasizes the trade-off between dividends and ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. Managers 
hat believe the ﬁrm has good future growth opportunities may desire a higher level of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. 
14 As explained in Section 4.3 , we also run robustness tests with ROA and loans growth instead of Market-to-book and Tobin 
 . 
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 We include in our regressions several controls in Eqs. (1) and (2) . Size, proﬁtability and growth
opportunities are believed to be the main drivers of dividend policy for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms ( Fama
and French, 2001 ). As stated above, we proxy for proﬁtability and growth opportunities using the
performance variables Market-to-book and Tobin Q . We proxy for Bank Size using the natural loga-
rithm of total bank assets. The non-bank literature documents that large ﬁrms tend to pay higher
dividends ( Fama and French, 2001; Francis et al., 2011 ). Thus, we expect the coeﬃcient on Bank Size
to be positive. The stage of the bank life-cycle, represented by earned equity ( DeAngelo et al., 2006;
DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007 ), is proxied by the Retained earnings ratio (retained earnings divided
by total equity). Banks with large values of earned equity are likely to be at a more mature stage of
their life-cycle, and thus should have more cash available for distribution to shareholders. In robust-
ness tests, we also consider speciﬁcally the impact of the tax differential between capital gains and
dividends, and we employ the total payout ratio (cash dividends plush share repurchases dividend by
equity). To allow for the effects of the Eurozone sovereign debt problems and the Capital Require-
ment and Bonuses Package (CRBP), which came into force on January 1, 2011, we include the dummy
Year > 2010 , which is equal to one for the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and zero otherwise. 15 
For the regressions on bank performance, we include the following set of controls: Board Size ,
RetVol (standard deviation of monthly bank stock returns), Size (log of total assets), and Year > 2010 ,
in addition to Treasury securities (the ratio of treasury securities to loans, which is an excluded in-
strument for the regressions on the payout ratio). These control variables are also justiﬁed by the
non-ﬁnancial literature, in particular Bhagat and Bolton (2013) . 16 
3.2. Instrumental variables 
Because dividend policy, performance, and corporate governance/ownership structure variables are 
endogenous, we must rely on an Instrumental Variables (IV) setup for our econometric strategy. 
The CEO power proxies ( CEO Ownership , Unforced CEO Turnover , and CEO Tenure ) are instrumented
by the dummy Founder CEO , which takes on the value one when the CEO of the bank is also one of the
founders. This variable is likely to be positively correlated with the degree of clout of the CEO within
the bank, and we expect Founder CEO to be positively correlated with CEO Ownership and CEO Tenure ,
and negatively correlated with Unforced Turnover. The CEO cannot decide every year to be a founder,
suggesting that Founder CEO is exogenous to dividend policy. For the performance proxies, we employ
the instrument Treasury securities , equal to the ratio of securities issued by governments to loans and
we expect a positive relationship between this ratio and performance because banks are likely to buy
these securities when government bond yields are high and bank stock prices are also high (resulting
in high Market-to-book and Tobin Q ). Conversely, in periods of high risk-aversion, “ﬂight to quality”
occurs, and investors move from stocks to government bonds, leading to lower Treasury bond yields
and Market-to-book and Tobin Q . Given that the level of Treasury securities depends mainly on current
conditions in the bond and stock markets, this variable is likely to be exogenous to dividend policy. 17 
A positive correlation between performance and investing in government securities rather than loans 
for sample periods including the 20 07–20 09 ﬁnancial crisis (as in our case) is consistent with Beltratti
and Stulz (2012) . 
For the proxy of director ownership, we choose the value of the stake of the CEO as an instrumen-
tal variable, CEO Ownership € (in millions of Euros). We expect CEO Ownership € to be positively cor-
related with Director Ownership €, simply because of cross-sectional differences in the average emolu- 
ments paid to board members and executives at the bank-level. Therefore, this variable is likely to be
exogenous to dividends and performance. 15 The CRBP imposes restrictions on executive compensation and is believed to reduce incentives to create value ( Murphy, 
2013 ). 
16 Bhagat and Bolton (2013) also include industry performance and the ratio of research and development plus advertising 
expenses to assets. However, we are only looking at the banking industry, for which research and development expenses are 
negligible, and advertising expenses are not reported. 
17 Bhagat and Bolton (2008, 2013) use treasury stock as an instrument for performance. However, this variable is not available 
for European banks. This proxy is also likely to be endogenous in the regressions using the total payout ratios as dependent 
variable. 
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(We instrument both Government Ownership and Government monitoring using a measure of own-
rship concentration, namely the Herﬁndahl–Hirshman Index (HHI). 18 The reason for our choice is
wofold: ﬁrst, when the government intervenes in the bank, it usually acquires large stakes in the
ank, thereby artiﬁcially increasing the level of ownership concentration – this fact generates a pos-
tive correlation between the HHI and the two proxies for government monitoring; second, because
he increase in HHI is a natural consequence of government monitoring, unrelated to bank dividend
olicy. Both the exclusion and relevance restrictions are thus satisﬁed. 
.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
We build a new hand-collected data set with information on board composition and ownership
tructure for 109 listed banks (commercial banks, bank holding companies, and cooperative banks) 19
ocated in 15 EU countries for the period 2005–2013. 20 The sample period starts in 2005 to reduce
he impact of different accounting standards on cross-country comparability, since in this year Inter-
ational Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became compulsory for all EU listed companies. 
We start with the universe of European publicly quoted banks listed on Bankscope (EU-15). For
he sake of comparability, we focus on banks which use IFRS accounting standards. We focus on insti-
utions classiﬁed as: commercial banks, bank holding companies, holding companies and cooperative
anks. A total number of 127 banks satisfy these selection criteria. Next, we exclude institutions for
hich data on gross loans is unavailable (6, resulting in 121 remaining banks). 21 Finally, to allow
and-collection of information on corporate governance and ownership structure, we stipulate that
here is at least one annual report (available on the bank’s web site) for the period 2005–2013. These
riteria results in a sample of 109 banks. The geographic distribution of our sample is similar to that
n the related literature. 22 
Table 1 presents the main steps of our sample construction. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the
umber of banks per country and type of bank, and the sample representativeness relative to the
opulation of listed banks in the EU-15 over the sample period. Our ﬁnal sample is an unbalanced
anel with 913 bank-year observations for 109 banks. However, data availability for the main variables
educes the amount of bank-year observations to 775, as shown in Table 3 . 
In our analysis, we concentrate on payout ratios as well as the decision to pay a dividend. We
alculate the dividend payout ratio ( DPE ) as dividends paid for a given year divided by bank equity.
ecause this variable is positively skewed, our main regressions are based on the natural logarithm of
PE . Table 3 reports statistics for the decision to pay a dividend (the dummy variable Dividends payer ),
PE (Ln) and proxies for CEO power and performance. We report the statistics for the whole sample
Panel A) and for the regressions on DPE (Ln), considering only the cases for which cash dividends are
aid by the bank (Panel B). 
Government shareholding is on average 2.7% for the whole sample (and 1.41% when we exclude
ases for which there are no dividends paid), considering cases even when the government does not
old any bank shares. However, when we consider only cases where the government has an owner-
hip stake the average value increases to 19.81% (10%). Therefore, as said above, once the government18 The HHI is measured as follows: 
H H I = 
N ∑ 
i =1 
s 2 i 
here s i is the ownership share for shareholder i . Given that this variable is highly positively skewed, we consider the natural 
ogarithm of the HHI in our regressions. 
19 All cooperative banks in our sample are publicly traded and, therefore, are partly owned by non-members. 
20 We collect information from different sources: bank annual reports (including notes to ﬁnancial statements), corporate 
overnance reports, and other documents available from the web sites of the banks, banking regulators and authorities, and 
ther publicly available sources. 
21 Our purpose is to exclude ﬁrms that are not in the lending business, as in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) . 
22 The geographic distribution of our sample differs slightly from that of Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) , who investigate 
1 banks from Europe for the period 20 0 0–20 08, due to different selection criteria. In particular, Vallascas and Hagendorff
2013) stipulate that data on CEO compensation be available for at least ﬁve years. 
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Table 1 
Steps of sample construction. 
Search criterion Number of banks 
Step 1 Listed banks 2454 
Step 2 World region: European Union (15) 255 
Step 3 Accounting standards: IFRS 187 
Step 4 Specialization: Commercial banks, Cooperative banks, Bank holdings & Holding companies 127 
Step 5 Information availability: gross loans 121 
Step 6 Information availability (annual reports on the banks’ web sites and market capitalization) 109 
Table 2 
Sample composition and representativeness. 
Country Banks Sample % Observations Sample % 
Austria 7 6 54 7 
Belgium 3 3 16 2 
Denmark 11 10 85 11 
Finland 4 4 24 3 
France 8 7 72 9 
Germany 9 8 68 9 
Greece 11 10 39 5 
Ireland 2 2 16 2 
Italy 22 20 153 20 
Luxembourg 2 2 14 2 
Netherlands 5 5 39 5 
Portugal 4 4 24 3 
Spain 8 7 59 8 
Sweden 4 4 36 5 
United Kingdom 9 8 76 10 
Total: 109 100 775 100 
BHC Commercial Cooperative Total 
Total bankscope sample in 2013 (listed banks, EU-15) 
1 Banks 38 78 24 140 
2 Sample % 27.14 55.71 17.14 10 0.0 0 
Sample banks 
3 Banks 30 68 11 109 
4 Sample % 27.52 62.39 10.10 10 0.0 0 
5 Representativeness, % (3/1) 78.95 87.18 45.83 77.86 
Total Bankscope sample in 2013 (listed banks, EU-15) 
1 Assets Millions of Euros 9,133,293 12,463,542 2,336,025 23,932,860 
2 Share of total assets, % 38.16 52.08 9.76 10 0.0 0 
Sample banks 
3 Assets millions of Euros 9,112,651 12,026,512 2,053,685 23,192,848 
4 Share of total assets, % 39.29 51.85 8.85 10 0.0 0 
5 Representativeness, % (3/1) 99.77 96.49 87.91 96.91 
 buys bank stocks, the ownership structure becomes immediately more concentrated and the HHI in- 
creases. The cases for which we have a government oﬃcial on the board of directors are 7.7% of the
total sample (5% when considering only dividend payers). 23 23 The voting rights of the government share are exercised by different types of individuals/groups, depending on the country 
examined. For instance, in Austria it is the Federal Minister of Finance, in Belgium the Council of Ministers. In France and the 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics for dividend policy, CEO power, director ownership, government monitoring, performance and other control variables. 
Panel A Panel B 
Obs. Mean SD Min Max Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Dividend payer Dummy variable: 1 if the bank has paid cash 
dividends in the year, and 0 otherwise 
775 0 .570 0 .495 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 442 1 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 
DPE (Ln) Natural log of dividends for a given year divided by 
bank equity 
442 1 .987 0 .913 0 .0 0 0 3 .350 442 1 .987 0 .913 0 .0 0 0 3 .350 
CEO ownership CEO equity stake in the bank (%) 775 1 .809 8 .775 0 .0 0 0 65 .950 442 2 .417 10 .703 0 .0 0 0 65 .950 
CEO tenure (Ln) Natural logarithm of the number of years for 
which the CEO has been in oﬃce 
766 1 .456 0 .906 0 .0 0 0 3 .434 437 1 .582 0 .895 0 .0 0 0 3 .434 
CEO unforced 
turnover 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is a CEO unforced 
turnover (see deﬁnition in Appendix A ), and 0 
otherwise 
775 0 .107 0 .309 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 442 0 .100 0 .300 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 
Director ownership 
€
Average director ownership, in millions of Euros 750 10 .921 47 .144 0 .0 0 0 594 .410 430 11 .903 35 .020 0 .0 0 0 266 .373 
Government 
ownership 
Government ownership stake in the bank (%) 775 2 .684 12 .043 0 .0 0 0 100 .0 0 0 442 1 .413 7 .194 0 .0 0 0 77 .312 
Govt. 
ownership > 0% 
Government ownership stake in the bank (%), for 
cases for which the government is an owner of the 
bank 
103 19 .808 27 .145 0 .003 100 .0 0 0 61 10 .235 16 .987 0 .003 77 .312 
Government oﬃcial 
on the Board 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is a government oﬃcial 
on the board, and 0 otherwise 
775 0 .077 0 .267 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 442 0 .050 0 .218 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 
Government 
monitoring 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is a government oﬃcial 
on the board or the government owns more than 
3% of the bank, and 0 otherwise 
775 0 .135 0 .342 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 442 0 .102 0 .303 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 
Market-to-book Market value of equity dividend by book value of 
equity 
775 1 .106 0 .772 0 .157 2 .964 442 1 .217 0 .776 0 .157 2 .964 
Tobin Q Market value of equity plus face value of debt 
divided by book value of equity plus face value of 
debt 
772 1 .108 0 .761 0 .173 2 .943 440 1 .220 0 .764 0 .173 2 .943 
Control variables 
Size Log of total assets 775 17 .313 2 .343 13 .155 21 .070 442 17 .587 2 .403 13 .155 21 .070 
Retained earnings 
ratio 
Retained earnings to total equity 775 38 .197 32 .516 −9 .223 90 .028 442 42 .373 31 .408 −9 .223 90 .028 
Board size Board members 774 13 .858 5 .157 6 .0 0 0 24 .0 0 0 442 14 .186 5 .081 6 .0 0 0 24 .0 0 0 
Notes: Panel A includes all available observations and Panel B considers only observations for which cash dividends are paid in that year. DPE , performance, and control 
variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
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 Fig. 1 shows the geographical distribution of the average DPE across countries over the sample
period. The effect of the ﬁnancial crisis of 20 08–20 09 and the subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt
problems elicit heterogeneous responses from banks in different European countries. All countries 
except for Belgium and Sweden experienced a reduction in mean DPE from 2008 onwards (Panel
A). When we compare 20 05–20 07 with 20 08–20 09, the mean DPE increases even for Danish banks.
Sharp declines in DPE occurred for the countries that were most affected by the crisis. For Portugal,
the mean DPE dropped from 5.22% in 20 05–20 07 to 2.44% in 20 08–20 09. For Italy it fell from 4.70%
to 2.91%. However, Irish banks were the most affected: the mean DPE was 6.82% just before the crisis
in 2007 and 0% from 2010 until the end of the sample period. In Fig. 2 , we compare the trend of DPE
over the sample period for Ireland, where there is a sharp drop after the crisis, and Sweden, where
DPE is overall stable. 
4. Results 
In this section, we report the results of our main regressions. We employ the econometric proce-
dure described in Section 3.1 . Section 4.1 reports the main results with respect to the effect of CEO
power on payout ratios and performance, and the effect of director ownership (a proxy for internal
monitoring on bank CEOs) on payout ratios and performance. Section 4.2 reports the main results for
the impact of government monitoring on payout ratios and performance. Section 4.3 reports robust-
ness checks. 
4.1. CEO power, dividends and bank performance 
4.1.1. Results for CEO Ownership, Unforced CEO Turnover and CEO Tenure 
Table 4 reports our main results for the 2SLS regressions on the relation between CEO power (prox-
ied by CEO Ownership , CEO Tenure , and Unforced CEO Turnover ) and the payout ratio, DPE (Ln), allow-
ing for the effect of bank performance as proxied by Market-to-Book and Tobin Q . The Kleibergen-Paap
tests for weak IV and the coeﬃcients on the IVs for the ﬁrst stage of the regressions support the
hypothesis that our instruments, Founder CEO and Treasury securities , are strongly correlated with the
CEO power and bank performance proxies, respectively. The results for the coeﬃcients on the prox-
ies for CEO power suggest a negative relation between CEO power and payout ratios. The results for
the coeﬃcients on the bank performance proxies show a positive relation between performance and 
payout ratios. 
To what extent are the results reported in Table 4 a result of sample selection bias? Table 5 re-
ports the results for Heckman selection models investigating the impact of CEO power, proxied by
CEO Ownership , and performance on the payout ratio ( DPE (Ln)), allowing for possible sample selec-
tion bias. Moreover, to increase the robustness of our results, we also run 3SLS models on the relation
between CEO power, dividends, and bank performance. In these regressions, we also add a key vari-
able to our framework: volatility of returns (standard deviation of monthly stock returns, RetVol ). This
variable is found to negatively affect performance ( Bhagat and Bolton, 2013 ). We posit that this vari-
able has an indirect effect on the payout ratio: ﬁrms with higher information costs are likely to have
more volatile earnings, and therefore they will favor lower payouts to reduce the likelihood that earn-
ings do not fall below some threshold needed to remit dividends. For this reason, RetVol enters the
selection equation in the Heckman models, and the equation on Market-to-Book and Tobin Q in the
3SLS models. 
The results in Table 5 show that CEO Ownership is still negatively correlated with DPE (Ln). More-
over, as expected, higher RetVol results in lower performance and a lower propensity to pay dividends.
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test on the.s signiﬁcance of the correlation between the residuals of the
outcome and selection equation for the Heckman selection model conﬁrm that some degree of sam-
ple selection bias exists. The 3SLS models also conﬁrm the positive relation between performance andUK, the shares are handled by agencies speciﬁcally appointed for this purpose (Agence des participations de l’État (APE) in 
France and the UK Financial Investments (UKFI) in the UK). 
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(A) Average DPE (%) across countries for 2005-2007 and 2008-2013.
(B) Average DPE (%) across countries for 2005-2007 and 2008-2009.
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Fig. 1. Average DPE (%) across countries over the sample period. 
p  
i  
B  
g  
c  
t  
C
wayout ratios, and indicate that CEOs increase their ownership as performance increases (performance
ncreases CEO Ownership ), but the opposite is not true ( CEO Ownership does not increase Market-to-
ook or Tobin Q ). The latter results suggest that CEO Ownership is a good proxy for “bad” corporate
overnance or, in other words, CEOs with large stockholdings are “entrenched”. However, the negative
oeﬃcient on CEO Ownership for the regressions on the payout ratio, DPE (Ln), is inconsistent with
he ﬁndings of the non-ﬁnancial literature on CEO power and the payout ratio, which documents that
EO entrenchment leads to higher dividend payout ratios ( Hu and Kumar, 2004 ). 24 24 The results for Unforced CEO Turnover and CEO Tenure , untabulated but available upon request, are qualitatively the same: 
hile these proxies do not improve performance, they suggest that more powerful CEOs tend to decrease payout ratios. 
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Fig. 2. Average DPE (%) over the sample period: Ireland and Sweden. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.1.2. Results for Director Ownership €
Does stronger internal monitoring from the board of directors improve bank performance? In Table
6 we examine the impact of Director Ownership € on bank payout ratios using Heckman selection 
models and 3SLS models that allow for the interactions between director ownership, dividend payout 
ratios, and performance. As said above, this variable has been found to be positively correlated with
performance in previous empirical studies ( Bhagat and Bolton, 2008, 2013 ). The results reported in
Table 6 conﬁrm that this is the case: Director Ownership € is positively related to both Market-to-
Book and the Tobin Q ratio. However, our results also provide some evidence of a negative impact on
dividend payout ratios, although the coeﬃcients on Director Ownership € are signiﬁcant for the 3SLS 
regressions but not for the Heckman selection model 
4.1.3. “Good” corporate governance and current and future performance 
To further dig deeper into the relationship between performance and “good/bad” corporate gover- 
nance, Table 7 reports the results of 2SLS regressions of current and future performance on Director
Ownership €, using as IV CEO Ownership €. The results conﬁrm that Director Ownership € increases
both current and future performance. Among the control variables, RetVol and Size decrease current 
performance, while the variable Treasury securities increases performance. The dummy Year > 2010 is 
related to a drop in performance, most likely because of the consequences of the ﬁnancial crisis and
the ensuing Eurozone sovereign debt problems. Besides Year > 2010 , Director Ownership € is the only
variable that affects both Market-to-Book and Tobin Q even in the following years ( t + 1 and t + 2). 
Tables 8 and 9 report the same results but for CEO Ownership , Unforced CEO Turnover and CEO
Tenure . The results suggest that CEO Ownership decreases current performance and the performance 
of the next year. However, the effect ceases to exist at t + 2. The results for Unforced CEO Turnover
and CEO Tenure conﬁrm the negative impact of our CEO power proxies on performance. 
To recap, the results for Director Ownership € are consistent with those provided by the entrench-
ment literature on non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms: director ownership improves performance. The results for CEO 
Ownership suggest that the entrenchment effect dominates the incentive effect, and entrenched CEOs 
do not increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from bank shareholders. These ﬁndings can 
be interpreted as evidence that performance-based incentives based on ownership stakes work well 
when they are applied to board members, but less well when applied to bank CEOs, for which the
entrenchment effect appears to dominate. Moreover, they suggest that entrenched bank CEOs have 
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Table 4 
Determinants of dividend payout: 2SLS regressions. 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) 
CEO Ownership −0.266 ∗∗∗ −0.242 ∗∗∗ −0.265 ∗∗∗ −0.221 ∗∗∗
( −3.616) ( −3.307) ( −2.904) ( −2.653) 
Unforced CEO turnover 1.845 ∗∗∗ 1.897 ∗∗
(3.0 0 0) (2.531) 
CEO tenure (Ln) −0.405 ∗∗∗ −0.382 ∗∗∗
( −3.399) ( −2.994) 
Director Ownership € −0.023 ∗∗∗ −0.025 ∗∗∗
( −3.356) ( −3.069) 
Market-to-Book 0.477 ∗∗∗ 1.534 ∗∗∗ 0.411 ∗∗∗ 1.099 ∗∗∗ 0.411 ∗∗∗
(4.987) (3.388) (3.879) (2.619) (3.879) 
Tobin Q 0.499 ∗∗∗ 1.342 ∗∗∗ 0.430 ∗∗∗ 1.219 ∗∗ 0.430 ∗∗∗
(5.153) (4.177) (4.021) (2.542) (4.021) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crisis (20 08–20 09) included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 
Founder CEO 2.159 ∗∗∗ 2.157 ∗∗∗ −0.311 ∗∗∗ −0.275 ∗∗∗ 1.417 ∗∗∗ 1.365 ∗∗∗
(12.406) (11.056) ( −4.383) ( −4.468) (6.727) (6.331) 
Treasury securities 0.213 ∗∗∗ 0.238 ∗∗∗
(4.624) (6.114) 
CEO Ownership € 0.056 ∗∗∗ 0.054 ∗∗∗
(4.183) (3.707) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 447 443 315 312 447 443 446 442 434 430 
Banks 77 76 61 60 77 76 77 76 74 73 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV test 153.9 122.2 21.37 37.37 19.21 19.96 45.27 40.09 17.49 13.74 
R-squared 0.336 0.346 0.225 0.310 −0.260 −0.288 0.193 0.213 −0.092 −0.147 
Notes: The controls include Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in 
parentheses. DPE (Ln), performance, and control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of dividend payout: Heckman selection and 3SLS models for CEO Ownership . 
Heckman (outcome) Heckman (outcome) 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 
DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) MTB CEO ownership DPE (Ln) Tobin Q CEO ownership 
CEO Ownership −0.007 ∗ −0.007 ∗ −0.426 ∗∗ −0.056 −0.427 ∗∗ −0.057 
( −1.673) ( −1.705) ( −2.144) ( −0.791) ( −2.144) ( −0.814) 
MTB 0.644 ∗∗∗ 1.768 ∗∗ 0.639 ∗∗
(9.611) (2.427) (2.341) 
Tobin Q 0.642 ∗∗∗ 1.786 ∗∗ 0.664 ∗∗
(9.387) (2.386) (2.314) 
Selection Selection 
RetVol −2.572 ∗∗∗ −2.532 ∗∗∗ −1.090 ∗∗∗ −1.049 ∗∗∗
( −3.153) ( −3.128) ( −2.708) ( −2.659) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rho −0.869 −0.876 
LR test ( H 0 : Rho = 0) 15.52 ∗∗∗ 17.24 ∗∗∗
Treasury securities 0.602 ∗∗∗ 0.591 ∗∗∗
(6.929) (6.920) 
Founder CEO 2.290 ∗∗∗ 2.293 ∗∗∗
(12.626) (12.338) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 775 772 301 301 301 300 300 300 
Banks 100 99 66 66 66 66 66 66 
R -squared 0.573 0.901 1.0 0 0 0.574 0.901 1.0 0 0 
Notes: The controls include Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in 
parentheses (for 2SLS models). DPE (Ln), performance, and control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at the 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
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Table 6 
Determinants of dividend payout: Heckman selection and 3SLS models for Director Ownership €. 
Heckman (outcome) Heckman (outcome) 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 
DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) MTB Director Ownership € DPE (Ln) Tobin Q Director Ownership €
Director Ownership € −0.001 −0.0 0 0 −0.039 ∗∗ 0.010 ∗∗∗ −0.039 ∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗
( −1.408) ( −1.377) ( −2.059) (2.600) ( −2.042) (2.615) 
MTB 0.645 ∗∗∗ 2.836 ∗∗ 10.941 
(9.477) (2.269) (0.522) 
Tobin Q 0.640 ∗∗∗ 2.883 ∗∗ 10.909 
(9.247) (2.236) (0.505) 
Selection Selection 
RetVol −2.863 ∗∗∗ −2.806 ∗∗∗ −1.408 ∗∗∗ −1.370 ∗∗∗
( −3.276) ( −3.247) ( −3.154) ( −3.129) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rho −0.815 −0.827 
LR test ( H 0 : Rho = 0) 6.31 ∗∗ 7.85 ∗∗∗
Treasury securities 0.058 0.057 
(0.644) (0.641) 
CEO Ownership € 0.072 ∗∗∗ 0.072 ∗∗∗
(2.816) (2.795) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 750 748 295 295 295 294 294 294 
Banks 97 97 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R -squared −0.076 0.884 0.784 −0.083 0.883 0.783 
Notes: The controls include Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . DPE (Ln), performance, and control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th 
percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
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Table 7 
Determinants of current and future performance: Director Ownership €. 
Performance proxy Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q 
Period t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2 
Director Ownership € 0.010 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.010 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗
(8.683) (4.676) (2.723) (8.668) (4.673) (2.723) 
Board Size −0.008 −0.011 −0.012 −0.008 −0.011 −0.012 
( −0.728) ( −1.033) ( −0.917) ( −0.727) ( −1.013) ( −0.901) 
RetVol −1.139 ∗∗ 0.465 0.702 −1.093 ∗∗ 0.461 0.691 
( −2.063) (0.979) (1.321) ( −2.014) (0.985) (1.321) 
Treasury securities 0.193 ∗∗∗ −0.021 0.002 0.191 ∗∗∗ −0.022 0.002 
(7.506) ( −0.754) (0.051) (7.549) ( −0.776) (0.073) 
Size −0.323 ∗∗ −0.079 0.029 −0.323 ∗∗ −0.082 0.029 
( −2.140) ( −0.511) (0.101) ( −2.172) ( −0.536) (0.102) 
Year > 2010 −0.749 ∗∗∗ −1.121 ∗∗∗ −0.829 ∗∗∗ −0.736 ∗∗∗ −1.102 ∗∗∗ −0.815 ∗∗∗
( −4.328) ( −6.522) ( −4.657) ( −4.321) ( −6.548) ( −4.648) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
CEO Ownership € 0.078 ∗∗∗ 0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.084 ∗∗∗ 0.078 ∗∗∗ 0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.084 ∗∗∗
(7.210) (5.111) (5.833) (7.208) (5.108) (5.832) 
Crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 285 263 233 284 261 233 
Banks 54 54 48 54 53 48 
Kleibergen-Paap 51.93 26.12 33.92 51.91 26.07 33.92 
R -squared 0.737 0.576 0.207 0.735 0.577 0.205 
Notes: 2SLS regressions for dividend payers. Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics 
in parentheses. Performance variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 little incentive to discourage monitoring from shareholders by increasing payout ratios. In the next 
section, we examine the impact of government monitoring on payout ratios and bank performance. 
4.2. Government monitoring, dividends and bank performance 
Table 10 reports the results for 2SLS and 3SLS regressions investigating the impact of government
monitoring on payout ratios. For the 2SLS models, the Kleibergen-Paap tests for weak IV and the
coeﬃcients on the IVs for the ﬁrst stage of the regressions supports the hypothesis that HHI is a
strong instrument for both Government Ownership (Ln) and Government monitoring . The results for our
2SL S and 3SL S regressions suggest that government monitoring decreases payout ratios, contrary to
what is argued by Gugler (2003) . These results backup the view that governments are keen to reduce
bank payout ratios for the fear of potential reputational damage and ﬁnancial losses deriving from
bank defaults. 
Is government monitoring good for bank performance? We answer this question in Table 11 . The
results suggest that government monitoring has little impact on bank current and future perfor-
mance. 25 These results are somewhat consistent with the ﬁndings reported by Iannotta et al. (2007) ,
who ﬁnd that in Europe government-owned banks do not outperform privately-owned banks. 
What happens if the government changes as a result of elections? To answer this question, we col-
lect data on elections (both parliamentary elections and, if available, presidential elections) from the 
Elections Database (website http://www.nsd.uib.no/european _ election _ database/ ). This website con- 25 It could be argued that some of these results are a result of a weak IV problem for our performance regressions. However, 
even when we employ similar OLS regressions with bank and year ﬁxed effects with robust standard errors clustered on the 
bank level, the results still suggest lack of correlation between government monitoring and bank performance. 
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Table 8 
Determinants of current and future performance: CEO Ownership . 
Performance proxy Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q 
Period t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2 
CEO ownership −0.141 ∗∗ −0.087 ∗ 0.012 −0.140 ∗∗ −0.086 ∗ 0.015 
( −2.244) ( −1.865) (0.116) ( −2.257) ( −1.858) (0.138) 
board size −0.006 −0.014 −0.015 −0.006 −0.014 −0.015 
( −0.463) ( −1.242) ( −1.026) ( −0.459) ( −1.221) ( −1.010) 
RetVol −1.443 ∗∗∗ −0.070 0.098 −1.396 ∗∗ −0.065 0.094 
( −2.592) ( −0.215) (0.294) ( −2.551) ( −0.201) (0.286) 
Treasury securities 0.256 ∗∗∗ 0.0 0 0 −0.044 0.254 ∗∗∗ 0.0 0 0 −0.044 
(6.939) (0.021) ( −0.801) (6.962) (0.001) ( −0.815) 
Size −0.331 ∗∗ −0.075 0.062 −0.331 ∗∗ −0.078 0.062 
( −1.963) ( −0.602) (0.199) ( −1.994) ( −0.632) (0.202) 
Year > 2010 −0.709 ∗∗∗ −1.132 ∗∗∗ −0.893 ∗∗∗ −0.696 ∗∗∗ −1.112 ∗∗∗ −0.879 ∗∗∗
( −8.055) ( −9.634) ( −5.781) ( −8.133) ( −9.663) ( −5.764) 
−0.141 ∗∗ −0.087 ∗ 0.012 −0.140 ∗∗ −0.086 ∗ 0.015 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
Founder CEO 2.232 ∗∗∗ 2.286 ∗∗∗ 2.239 ∗∗∗ 2.232 ∗∗∗ 2.286 ∗∗∗ 2.239 ∗∗∗
(39.334) (31.234) (22.735) (39.336) (31.250) (22.730) 
Crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 291 268 236 290 266 236 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
Kleibergen-Paap 1546 975.4 515.5 1546 975.9 515.5 
R -squared 0.789 0.773 0.652 0.789 0.773 0.651 
Notes: 2SLS regressions for dividend payers. Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in 
parentheses. Performance variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
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cains information on the outcomes of parliamentary elections in terms of total votes and percent-
ge of votes for each of the main parties in the elections. For presidential elections understanding
hether there is a change in power is straightforward. 26 However, the parliamentary elections in-
ormation needs to be supplemented with other data sources because governments can be formed by
arious coalitions between two or more parties. As such, we combine the aforementioned information
ith other sources (such as Bloomberg, European Journal of Political Research-Political Data Yearbook,
he Guardian, and Reuters) to determine whether the elections determined a change in government.
e then run probit regressions where the dependent variable is the ﬁrst-difference of the dummy
overnment Oﬃcial on the Board and the independent variable is either Elections (a dummy variable
qual to one if in the previous year there is either a parliamentary or a presidential election and zero
therwise) or Change in Government (a dummy variable equal to one if in the previous year there is a
hange in the parties in government and zero otherwise). The results, untabulated but available upon
equest, suggest that Change in Government does not have any effect on the probability of a change
n Government Oﬃcial on the Board . However, this may be due to the low number of cases for which
here was a change in government. When we consider the results for the probit regressions with Elec-
ions , we ﬁnd that they increase the probability that there will be government oﬃcial on the board
f a bank in the next year. 27 However, when we include Elections in the regressions on dividend pay-26 For instance, consider the 2012 presidential elections in France, as a result of which Nicolas Sarkozy (center-right) was 
eplaced by François Hollande. On the other hand, in the 2010 elections in the UK, the Labour party (incumbent) received the 
argest number of votes, but the coalition between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats resulted in a change in government. 
27 We also ﬁnd evidence of a negative impact of Elections on bank proﬁtability (as measured by Market-to-Book and Tobin Q ), 
onsistent with Iannotta et al. (2013) . 
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Table 9 
Determinants of current and future performance: Unforced CEO Turnover and CEO Tenure . 
Performance proxy Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q 
Period t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2 
Unforced CEO Turnover 1.107 ∗ 0.528 ∗ −0.065 1.075 ∗ 0.520 ∗ −0.077 
(1.801) (1.718) ( −0.116) (1.815) (1.708) ( −0.138) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
Founder CEO −0.284 ∗∗∗ −0.377 ∗∗∗ −0.425 ∗∗∗ −0.290 ∗∗∗ −0.377 ∗∗∗ −0.425 ∗∗∗
( −3.885) ( −5.834) ( −6.878) ( −3.956) ( −5.832) ( −6.876) 
Controls and crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 291 268 236 290 266 236 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
Kleibergen-Paap 15.08 34.03 47.18 15.64 33.99 47.18 
R -squared 0.440 0.701 0.657 0.460 0.700 0.657 
CEO Tenure −0.194 ∗ −0.103 ∗ 0.015 −0.191 ∗∗ −0.102 ∗ 0.017 
( −1.953) ( −1.816) (0.122) ( −1.965) ( −1.808) (0.144) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
Founder CEO 1.609 ∗∗∗ 1.921 ∗∗∗ 1.933 ∗∗∗ 1.629 ∗∗∗ 1.921 ∗∗∗ 1.933 ∗∗∗
(7.875) (11.420) (12.842) (8.031) (11.411) (12.839) 
Controls and crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 290 267 235 289 265 235 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
Kleibergen-Paap 62.00 130.5 164.5 64.47 130.2 164.5 
R -squared 0.747 0.761 0.658 0.751 0.761 0.658 
Notes: 2SLS regressions for dividend payers. The controls include RetVol , Board size , Treasury securities , Size , and Year > 2010 . 
Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in parentheses. Performance variables are win- 
sorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 outs, Elections does not have any impact on DPE (Ln), and the results for the other coeﬃcients remain
substantially unaltered. 
4.3. Robustness tests 
In this section we present robustness tests to allow for other determinants of dividend policy that
may have not been considered in the regressions reported in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 . 
We start from the possibility of tax clienteles ( Elton and Gruber, 1970 ). In Table 12 we report
robustness tests using 2SLS models considering the effect of the tax differential ( Tax Differential ) be-
tween capital gains and dividends. 28 To further increase the robustness of our ﬁndings, we also con-
sider the effect of using the natural logarithm of CEO Ownership . The coeﬃcients on Tax Differen-
tial tend to be negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero. This ﬁnding is consistent with
DeAngelo et al. (2008) who found that taxes may not be ﬁrst-order determinant of the choice be-
tween dividends and stock repurchases. The magnitude and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients on the 
other variables are substantially the same as those reported in Tables 4 and 5 . In Table 13 , follow-
ing Hirtle (2014) , we investigate the impact of considering total payouts on our analysis. We replace
DPE (cash dividends to bank equity) with the sum of cash dividends and the cash distributed through28 The data on the tax rates for dividends and capital gains is taken from Carroll et al. (2012) . 
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Table 10 
Impact of government monitoring on dividend payout ratio. 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 
DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) 
Government Ownership (Ln) −0.175 ∗∗ −0.171 ∗ −0.213 ∗∗∗ −0.134 ∗∗∗
( −1.975) ( −1.909) ( −3.127) ( −2.819) 
Government monitoring −1.311 ∗∗ −1.278 ∗∗ −1.638 ∗∗∗ −1.664 ∗∗∗
( −2.046) ( −1.970) ( −2.932) ( −4.076) 
Market-to-Book 0.424 ∗∗∗ 0.392 ∗∗∗ 2.501 ∗∗∗ 2.214 ∗∗
(4.071) (3.469) (2.874) (2.569) 
Tobin Q 0.446 ∗∗∗ 0.415 ∗∗∗ 0.342 ∗∗∗ −0.057 
(4.179) (3.627) (2.875) ( −0.454) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crisis (20 08–20 09) included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 
HHI (Ln) 1.253 ∗∗∗ 1.252 ∗∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗∗ 1.367 ∗∗∗ 1.367 ∗∗∗ 0.164 ∗∗∗ 0.104 ∗∗∗
(3.198) (3.191) (3.262) (3.256) (6.733) (6.875) (5.742) (3.709) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 450 446 450 446 303 302 303 302 
Banks 77 76 77 76 65 65 65 65 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV test 10.23 10.18 10.64 10.60 – – – –
R -squared 0.350 0.357 0.245 0.256 0.341 0.709 0.352 0.623 
Notes: The controls include Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . Government monitoring is a dummy equal to one if 
government ownership is above 3% or there is a government oﬃcial on the board of the bank. HHI stands for Herﬁndahl–
Hirschman Index. Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in parentheses (for 2SLS 
models). For the sake of space, we do not report the results for the regressions on the performance variables, Market-to-Book 
and Tobin Q , and the government monitoring variables, Government Ownership and Government monitoring . However, we report 
the coeﬃcients (and related standard errors) for the HHI in the regressions on the government monitoring variables. As for 
Table 5–9 , for the 3SLS models the regressions on the performance variables include RetVol and Treasury securities. DPE (Ln), 
performance, and control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
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ttock repurchases divided by total equity ( TP ). 29 The coeﬃcients on the CEO power proxies remain
igniﬁcant and with the expected sign. 30 
We further examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in the dependent variable by substi-
uting DPE (Ln) with the ratio of dividends to total assets. The results for the CEO power proxies and
or director ownership remain substantially unaltered, as shown in Table 14 . 
Finally, we carry out further robustness tests on the effect of capital requirements, loans growth,
nd the proxy for proﬁtability. 31 
First, to examine the impact of capital requirements ( Onali, 2014 ), we include in the 2SLS regres-
ions with the CEO power proxies (including the log of CEO Ownership ) the dummy variable Close ,
hich takes the value one if the Tier 1 ratio is less or equal to six percent and zero otherwise. The
oeﬃcients on Close are negative and either weakly signiﬁcant or insigniﬁcant, and the magnitude and
ign of the coeﬃcients on the CEO power proxies remain virtually unaltered. 
Second, we run again the 2SLS regressions with the CEO power proxies (including the log of CEO
wnership ) after replacing Market-to-book and Tobin Q with the variables ROA (Return on Assets) and
oans Growth (the percentage change in loans from t − 1 to t ). ROA is a proxy for performance and29 We download data on share repurchases from SNL Financial. 
30 We also run again the 2SLS regressions with Government Ownership and Government monitoring , adding the tax differential 
s an explanatory variable, and considering the total payout ratios instead of cash dividends only. The results remain substan- 
ially the same as those reported in Tables 10 and 11 . 
31 These results are untabulated for the sake of space but available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 11 
Determinants of current and future performance: Government Ownership and Government monitoring . 
Performance proxy Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q 
Period t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2 
Government Own. (Ln) 0.009 0.063 0.132 0.009 0.062 0.131 
(0.165) (1.059) (1.183) (0.180) (1.059) (1.185) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
HHI (Ln) 1.382 ∗∗∗ 1.250 ∗∗∗ 0.942 ∗∗ 1.382 ∗∗∗ 1.250 ∗∗∗ 0.942 ∗∗
(3.122) (3.196) (2.156) (3.123) (3.196) (2.155) 
Controls and crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 294 271 239 293 269 239 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
R -squared 0.782 0.739 0.548 0.783 0.739 0.546 
Kleibergen-Paap 9.743 10.22 4.635 9.752 10.21 4.635 
Government monitoring 0.074 0.511 0.976 0.078 0.504 0.968 
(0.165) (1.090) (1.222) (0.180) (1.089) (1.224) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
HHI (Ln) 0.165 ∗∗∗ 0.153 ∗∗∗ 0.127 ∗∗ 0.165 ∗∗∗ 0.153 ∗∗∗ 0.127 ∗∗
(2.794) (2.755) (2.063) (2.794) (2.755) (2.062) 
Controls and crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 294 271 239 293 269 239 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
R -squared 0.781 0.736 0.551 0.781 0.736 0.549 
Kleibergen-Paap 7.802 7.591 4.245 7.806 7.586 4.245 
Notes: 2SLS regressions for dividend payers. The controls include RetVol , Board size , Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . 
Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in parentheses. Performance variables are win- 
sorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Loans Growth is a proxy for growth opportunities. The coeﬃcients on the CEO power proxies remain
negative and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on ROA is insigniﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient on Loans Growth
is negative and signiﬁcant. A negative coeﬃcient on growth opportunities is consistent with the ﬁnd-
ings reported in the non-ﬁnancial literature ( Fama and French, 2001 ). When we repeat estimations
using the proxy CEO Duality (a dummy variable that takes that value one if the CEO is also the chair-
man of the board and zero otherwise), instrumented by number of independent directors 32 divided
by the total number of board members, the results remain qualitatively the same. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the effects of CEO power on dividend policy in banks from EU-15
countries. We use a unique hand-collected data set with information on board composition and own-
ership structure for European listed banks over the period 2005–2013. We exploit detailed bank-level
data on government ownership and oﬃcials represented on bank boards to investigate the impact of
government monitoring on bank dividend policy. This sample is merged with data from Bankscope 
and bank annual reports that provides information on dividends and other ﬁnancial characteristics. 
According to the (non-bank) managerial entrenchment literature, dividend payout ratios are pos- 
itively related to CEO power since dividends discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. The 32 For an explanation of how we deﬁne independent directors, see Appendix A.4 . 
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Table 12 
Robustness tests considering the effect of the tax differential between capital gains and dividends. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) 
CEO Ownership −0.237 ∗∗∗ −0.214 ∗∗
( −2.699) ( −2.412) 
CEO Ownership (Ln) −0.113 ∗∗ −0.103 ∗∗
( −2.510) ( −2.231) 
Unforced CEO turnover 2.102 ∗∗ 2.080 ∗
(2.067) (1.765) 
CEO tenure (Ln) −0.373 ∗∗∗ −0.333 ∗∗
( −2.716) ( −2.374) 
Director Ownership € −0.023 ∗∗∗ −0.025 ∗∗∗
( −3.194) ( −2.929) 
Market-to-Book 0.471 ∗∗∗ 0.431 ∗∗∗ 0.365 ∗∗∗ 0.408 ∗∗∗ 1.107 ∗∗
(4.744) (3.884) (2.935) (3.713) (2.516) 
Tobin Q 0.493 ∗∗∗ 0.456 ∗∗∗ 0.366 ∗∗∗ 0.434 ∗∗∗ 1.238 ∗∗
(4.921) (4.170) (2.688) (3.938) (2.445) 
Tax differential −0.006 −0.005 −0.001 −0.001 0.012 0.008 −0.004 −0.006 −0.005 −0.006 
( −0.498) ( −0.456) ( −0.069) ( −0.053) (0.484) (0.338) ( −0.304) ( −0.529) ( −0.441) ( −0.483) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
Founder CEO 2.131 ∗∗∗ 2.124 ∗∗∗ 4.464 ∗∗∗ 4.403 ∗∗∗ −0.241 ∗∗∗ −0.219 ∗∗∗ 1.357 ∗∗∗ 1.369 ∗∗∗
(12.551) (10.976) (6.204) (5.643) ( −2.928) ( −3.056) (5.850) (5.796) 
CEO Ownership € 0.055 ∗∗∗ 0.052 ∗∗∗
(3.908) (3.467) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crisis (20 08–20 09) included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 443 439 443 439 443 439 442 438 430 426 
Banks 76 75 76 75 76 75 76 75 73 72 
R -squared 0.339 0.348 0.265 0.285 −0.470 −0.445 0.209 0.241 −0.108 −0.169 
Kleibergen-Paap 157.7 120.6 38.53 31.87 8.583 9.347 34.26 33.63 15.28 12.03 
Notes: 2SLS regressions. The controls include Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust 
t -statistics in parentheses. DPE (Ln), performance, and control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
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Table 13 
Robustness tests: regressions results for the ratio of cash dividends plus share repurchases divided by equity ( TP ). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
TP (Ln) TP (Ln) TP (Ln) TP (Ln) TP (Ln) TP (Ln) TP (Ln) TP (Ln) TP (Ln) TP (Ln) 
CEO Ownership −0.206 ∗∗∗ −0.170 ∗∗
( −2.774) ( −2.488) 
CEO Ownership (Ln) −0.091 ∗∗∗ −0.076 ∗∗
( −2.740) ( −2.421) 
Unforced CEO turnover 1.429 ∗∗∗ 1.335 ∗∗
(2.919) (2.309) 
CEO tenure (Ln) −0.314 ∗∗∗ −0.269 ∗∗
( −2.822) ( −2.423) 
Director Ownership € −0.023 ∗∗∗ −0.026 ∗∗∗
( −3.218) ( −2.970) 
Market-to-Book 0.447 ∗∗∗ 0.419 ∗∗∗ 0.383 ∗∗∗ 0.395 ∗∗∗ 1.065 ∗∗∗
(4.755) (4.068) (3.769) (3.913) (2.598) 
Tobin Q 0.477 ∗∗∗ 0.452 ∗∗∗ 0.402 ∗∗∗ 0.428 ∗∗∗ 1.204 ∗∗
(4.961) (4.488) (3.777) (4.211) (2.571) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
Founder CEO 2.159 ∗∗∗ 2.157 ∗∗∗ 4.859 ∗∗∗ 4.837 ∗∗∗ −0.311 ∗∗∗ −0.275 ∗∗∗ 1.417 ∗∗∗ 1.365 ∗∗∗
(12.406) (11.056) (7.046) (6.460) ( −4.383) ( −4.468) (6.727) (6.331) 
CEO Ownership € 0.056 ∗∗∗ 0.054 ∗∗∗
(4.183) (3.707) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crisis (20 08–20 09) included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 447 443 447 443 447 443 446 442 434 430 
Banks 77 76 77 76 77 76 77 76 74 73 
R -squared 0.301 0.315 0.264 0.291 −0.003 0.040 0.231 0.259 −0.132 −0.191 
Kleibergen-Paap 153.9 122.2 49.65 41.73 19.21 19.96 45.27 40.09 17.49 13.74 
Notes: 2SLS regressions. The controls include Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust 
t -statistics in parentheses. TP (Ln), performance, and control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
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Table 14 
Determinants of dividend payout: dividends to total assets ( DTA ). 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA DTA 
CEO Ownership −0.065 ∗∗∗ −0.057 ∗∗∗ −0.100 ∗∗∗ −0.087 ∗∗∗
( −4.103) ( −3.734) ( −4.213) ( −4.237) 
Unforced CEO turnover 0.454 ∗∗∗ 0.449 ∗∗∗
(3.466) (2.757) 
CEO tenure (Ln) −0.100 ∗∗∗ −0.091 ∗∗∗
( −3.815) ( −3.229) 
Director Ownership € −0.004 ∗∗ −0.005 ∗∗
( −2.264) ( −2.128) 
Market-to-Book 0.051 ∗ 0.214 ∗ 0.031 0.034 0.158 ∗∗
(1.718) (1.910) (0.902) (1.053) (2.057) 
Tobin Q 0.057 ∗ 0.152 ∗ 0.032 0.040 0.186 ∗∗
(1.805) (1.858) (0.878) (1.175) (2.094) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crisis (20 08–20 09) included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 
Founder CEO 2.159 ∗∗∗ 2.157 ∗∗∗ −0.311 ∗∗∗ −0.275 ∗∗∗ 1.417 ∗∗∗ 1.365 ∗∗∗
(12.406) (11.056) ( −4.383) ( −4.468) (6.727) (6.331) 
Treasury securities 0.213 ∗∗∗ 0.238 ∗∗∗
(4.624) (6.114) 
CEO Ownership € 0.056 ∗∗∗ 0.054 ∗∗∗
(4.183) (3.707) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 447 443 315 312 447 443 446 442 434 430 
Banks 77 76 61 60 77 76 77 76 74 73 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV test 153.9 122.2 21.37 37.37 19.21 19.96 45.27 40.09 17.49 13.74 
R -squared 0.363 0.355 0.307 0.371 −0.341 −0.364 0.195 0.207 0.0 0 0 −0.084 
Notes: 2SLS regressions for dividend payers. The controls include Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, 
heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in parentheses. DTA , performance, and control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
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 non-bank evidence from Europe also suggests that dividends dampen expropriation of minority share- 
holders consistent with a positive relation between dividend payout ratios and expropriation incen- 
tives. However, we ﬁnd that monitoring from the government leads to an inverse relation between
CEO power and dividend payouts. Entrenched bank CEOs pay lower dividends and in doing so are less
likely to attract undesired attention from government regulators. 
Our main ﬁndings document a negative relation between CEO ownership and CEO tenure and pay-
out ratios, and a positive link between unforced CEO turnover events and dividend payout ratios.
CEO ownership and CEO tenure are also negatively related to bank performance, while unforced CEO
turnover events are associated with increases in bank performance. These ﬁndings suggest that en- 
trenched CEOs in European banks do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage
monitoring from shareholders. We also provide evidence that director ownership improves perfor- 
mance (as suggested by the non-ﬁnancial literature) and reduces dividend payout ratios. According 
to the non-ﬁnancial literature, the more effective internal governance mechanisms are, the larger the 
payouts required for entrenched managers to discourage monitoring. Our ﬁndings, on the other hand, 
suggest that in European banks the members of the board of directors tend to prefer low dividend
payout ratios to support the capital position of the bank. 
We also document that government monitoring does not have a signiﬁcant effect on bank perfor-
mance but impinges on payout ratios. In line with the view that the government puts the interests
of depositors before that of bank shareholders, we provide evidence of a negative relation between
government ownership and payout ratios. When there is a government oﬃcial on the board banks
make lower dividend payouts. In conclusion, these results are consistent with the view that in bank-
ing, entrenched CEOs do not have a strong incentive to pay large dividends, because of a combination
of weak minority shareholders regulation, an ineﬃcient market for corporate control, and concerns of 
the government over bank soundness. These factors lead to the negative relation between CEO power
and dividend payouts. 
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Appendix A 
Deﬁnition of Unforced CEO Turnover, Government Oﬃcials, Board Members and Independent Directors. 
In this section we brieﬂy describe the criteria employed to determine whether there is a govern-
ment oﬃcial on the board of directors (BoD) and whether a member of the BoD is ‘independent’. 
A.1. Unforced CEO turnover 
To collect data on CEO turnover, we use LEXIS/NEXIS, and employ a key-word search procedure
based on Schaeck et al. (2012) to distinguish between forced and unforced CEO turnovers during
2005–2010. After collecting data on the year of the CEO turnover and the CEO name, we look for CEO
turnover based on the following keywords: ‘management change’, ‘forced resignation’, ‘turnover’, ‘sep- 
aration’, ‘ousted’, ‘early retirement’, ‘step down’, ‘mandatory separation’, ‘voluntary separation’, ‘ﬁred’, 
‘made redundant’, ‘departure’, ‘management succession’, ‘executive change’ and ‘tenure’. These data 
are matched with the bank name. 
Following Schaeck et al. (2012) , we classify a turnover as ‘forced’ if the CEO is reported to have
been dismissed, forced to resign or to have left the bank due to undisclosed policy differences. We
deﬁne all remaining CEO turnovers as unforced, unless they meet at least one of the following criteria
( Schaeck et al., 2012 ): 
(a) the reason for the CEO turnover is declared not to be: death, poor health, or acceptance of a
position either elsewhere or within the bank; 
(b) it is reported that the reason for the CEO turnover is retirement, but retirement is not an-
nounced until at least six months prior to succession. 
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t  Moreover, if a reason for CEO turnover is not provided, we assume that the turnover is forced due
o disciplining actions or due to company policy disputes. 
Following the criteria listed above, we classify 86 CEO turnovers, of which 22 are forced (which
ccurred mainly in the period 2008–2010). We classify the remaining 64 CEO turnovers as unforced. 
.2. Government oﬃcials 
We qualify a board member as a government representative if any individual is described in the
nnual report of the bank by one of the following combination of words: ‘Government commissioner’,
Government representative’, ‘Representatives of the regulatory authority’, and ‘Deputy government
ommissioner’. In certain cases, the government oﬃcial is identiﬁed by a combination of words that
ncludes the name of the country. For instance, for Lloyds Banking Group Plc, the government oﬃcial
s identiﬁed by the words ‘Board Representative for Scotland’, while for the Greek bank Alpha Bank
E, the government oﬃcial is identiﬁed by the words ‘representative of the Hellenic Republic’. For 15
anks in our sample the variable Government Oﬃcial on the Board is equal to one in at least one year
uring the sample period for a total of 60 bank-year observations (as reported in Table 3 , for which
.7% of the total available observations for Government Oﬃcial on the Board (775) take on the value
ne). Out of this 60 observations, 52 refer to the period 2008–2013, suggesting that in most cases
overnment oﬃcials were appointed as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis and the recent sovereign debt
risis in the EU. The countries for which the dummy variable is equal to one in at least one year are:
ustria, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK. 
.3. Board members 
EU banks can have a one-tier or two-tier corporate governance structure (or board structure). As
he name suggests, a two-tier governance structure is one with two boards of directors. The manage-
ent and monitoring function are performed by the two boards in a separate fashion in the two-tier
ase, and by different members of the board in the one-tier case ( Arnaboldi and Casu, 2011 ). 
The deﬁnitions of one-tier and two-tier structure vary according to country. For banks in our sam-
le, the management function is performed by a board usually named the ‘management board’ or
executive board’, while the monitoring function is performed by a board usually named the ‘Board of
irectors’, or ‘non-executive supervisory board’. 
For banks with a two-tier board structure, we use the following keywords to identify members of
he ‘management board’: ‘Management board’, ‘Executive board’, ‘Executive management’, ‘Executive
eam’, ‘Executive committee’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘CEO & CFO’, ‘Managing director’, and ‘General man-
ger’. For banks with a one-tier board structure we use the following keywords to identify members
f the ‘management board’: ‘Executive committee’, ‘Management committee’, ‘Delegated committee’,
Executive board’, Management board’, ‘General management’, ‘General manager’, ‘Management’, ‘Gen-
ral directors’, ‘Group executive management’, and ‘Group executive committee’. 
For banks with a two-tier board structure, we use the following keywords to identify members
f the ‘supervisory board’: ‘Supervisory board’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Advisory board’. As explained in
ection A4, we consider all members of the ‘supervisory board’ as ‘independent directors’ for banks
ith a two-tier board structure. 
For banks with a one-tier board structure, we use the criteria set out in Section A4 to identify
independent directors’, i.e. directors with a monitoring role. 
.4. Independent directors 
We deﬁne ‘independent directors’ as reported in a bank’s annual report. A member of the Board
f Directors (BoD) is deemed to be independent if such persons do not have any business or personal
elations with the company or its management board. In many cases, banks self-report the degree of
oard independence of their own BoD. This is usually deﬁned as the number of independent directors
ivided by number of BoD members excluding employee representatives and government representa-
ives. We use the same approach for board independence calculation for comparability of the results
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 across different banks. For example, in Nordea Bank’s annual report, independent directors are de- 
ﬁned as ‘[…] the number of Board members who are independent in relation to the Company and
its executive management as well as independent in relation to the Company’s major shareholders.’ 
For banks with a two-tier corporate governance structure, we consider as independent directors the 
members of the supervisory board. For banks with a one-tier board structure, we deﬁne independent
directors according to the criteria listed above. 
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